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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses accounting related to corporate governance and is organized as 
follows. The first section deals with understanding the concept of accounting 
conservatism. In the second section we analyzed the Relevance of Accounting 
Conservatism in Corporate Governance to the modern corporate world. The third section 
includes a Case Study on Ericsson, a Swedish Telecommunications company and 
conservatism in strong governance firms versus weak governance firms. The fourth part 
is devoted to the conclusion of our research efforts. 
From this study, we conclude that there are several reasons to use accounting 
conservatism in corporate governance and that current empirical evidence indicates that 
conservatism has increased in the last decades.  
The value of β3 in Table 1 indicates that there is a positive significant level of 
conservatism in accounting practices followed by Ericsson. When the dependent variable 
is earnings (X), the asymmetric timeliness of earnings coefficient β3 in Table 2 provides 
an estimate of the level of conservatism. We observe that strong governance firms are 
more conservative than weak governance firms (0.13 versus 0.04). 
We expect and hypothesize that strong governance structures will tend to favour 
accounting conservatism more than weak governance structures. However, excessive 
dependencies on old structures show poor growth that has been since the oil crisis.  
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1. The concept of Accounting Conservatism 
The concept of conservatism in accounting practices has remained a predominant 
characteristic of the accounting field for several centuries. However, standard-setters and 
accountants have heavily criticized the concept of conservatism. In the IASB Framework 
it also says that following the accounting standards will normally result in accounts that 
give a “true and fair view”.  The recent trend against conservatism in favour of the true 
and fair view could by illustrated by the following quote of a finance professor: 
 
“Conservatism is under attack from certain circles. For example, some (including even 
the FASB) are now suggesting it may be better to abandon conservatism in order to show 
more unbiased financial statements.” 
 
In this paper the opposite view will be taken, that accounting conservatism is an 
important aspect of an efficient corporate governance system. Our view will be supported 
by theory and a case study will be performed to investigate our hypothesis, that there is a 
positive relationship between a high degree of accounting conservatism and “good” 
corporate governance.  
  
Sterling called conservatism the most influential principle of valuation in accounting.1  
Conservatism is defined as the differential verifiability required for recognition of profits 
versus losses. The principle holds that when you are in doubt the accounting alternative 
that is least likely to overstate assets and income should be chosen.2  
 
The conservative accounting method will have an impact both on earnings and net asset 
value. The effect on earnings will depend on whether the investments are growing, stable 
or decreasing. Conservative accounting always results in a lower net asset value of the 
company. Practices that take place to give a lower value of net assets is for example short 
                                                 
1
 Sterling (1970), p. 256.  
2
  Schroeder et al (2001), p. 78. 
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depreciation periods of tangible assets, LIFO inventory methods, overestimations of 
pensions and warranties and expensing of R&D expenditures.3  
 
The principle of conservatism originally gained prominence as a partial offset to the 
eternal optimism of management and the tendency to overstate financial statements that 
characterized the first three decades of the 20th century. Many accountants believed that 
by placing the least favorable alternative valuation on the firm, the users of financial 
accounting information were less likely to be misled.4 In recent years the stock market 
participants have demanded accounts with market values rather than accounting values 
and hence the principle of conservatism has lost ground.  The new IFRS accounting 
principles apply in Sweden as of May 1st 2005 to Swedish listed companies. These rules 
demand updated valuations in the entire balance sheet in each quarterly report. Under the 
new rules Sweden will probably take a step towards less accounting conservatism for the 
listed companies. The Swedish corporate earning reports for the year 2004 include 
comments on how the new IFRS-rules will change financial reporting after May 1st and 
also comparisons to how previous year’s accounts would have closed if the new rules had 
been applied already at the day of closing balances. The reason for the new rules is the 
adjustment process towards international accounting standards in the EU. 
 
2. The importance of Accounting Conservatism in Corporate 
Governance 
The stock market participants prefer market values, but researchers in corporate 
governance show several benefits with conservatism and divide them into the following 
categories: 
• Reduction of litigation costs 
• Tax optimization 
• Regulators asymmetric loss functions 
• Contracting5 
                                                 
3
 Penman (2004), p. 575.  
4
 Schroeder et al (2001), p. 78. 
5
 Watts, 2003b. 
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The first argument for a use of conservatism is that it reduces litigation costs. 
Conservatism, by understating net assets, reduces the firm’s expected litigation costs. 
However, this argument is not very relevant for Swedish conditions since there is no 
extensive use of litigation here in contrast to the US.  
 
The second argument for conservatism in accounting could be relevant. If taxation and 
reporting are linked it is natural that it can cause conservatism in financial reporting. For 
example by delaying tax payments the present value of those will be lower and 
consequently result in a higher firm value. This argument could be relevant for Swedish 
conditions, we think that taxation and reporting are sometimes linked, but no 
investigation of the Swedish tax system has been made to find out.  
 
Also financial reporting standard-setters and regulators have their own incentives to 
induce conservative accounting and reporting. Just as there is an asymmetry in litigation 
costs, there is an asymmetry in regulators’ costs. Standard-setters and regulators are more 
likely to be blamed if firms overstate net assets than if they understate net assets. 
Conservatism reduces the political costs imposed on standard-setters and regulators. 
Despite this argument, the recent trend is that standard-setters are in favour of the true 
and fair view.   
 
Finally, the contracting argument is probably the most important argument for accounting 
conservatism from a corporate governance point of view. Many contracts between parties 
to the firm use accounting numbers to reduce agency costs associated with the firm. 
Those contracts include contracts between the firm and the debtholders and management 
compensation contracts. The contracting parties want timely information of performance 
and value of net assets (that is if a performance that generates revenues takes place in a 
certain time, that event should be included in the accounts for the same time). The 
problem is that much information that could make relevant measures timely and 
informative are not easily verified. For example, the expected increase in net cash flows 
due to new product development is useful information for evaluating a manager’s 
performance. However, there is no legal claim to those future net cash inflow estimates 
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and the estimates are not verifiable because they often depend on assumptions about the 
future that experts cannot agree upon. Because they cannot be verified, the estimates are 
not used in contracts. Hence, verification is necessary for contracting, but the question is 
then, why is a higher degree of verification required for gains than for losses? Part of the 
explanation is that the relevant parties to the firm have asymmetric payoffs from the 
contracts. If the value of the net assets are higher at maturity than expected the 
debtholders receive no extra compensation, but if they are lower than expected they 
might receive less than the contracted sum. Hence, the debtholders always gain if the 
value of a firm’s assets is biased downwards. Debtholders gain from conservative net 
asset values in another aspect. A debt contract often has a debt covenant, meaning that 
the company is not allowed to pay out too much of the earnings to the shareholders. Net 
assets valued in a conservative way reduces the likelihood that the shareholders will be 
favoured at the cost of the debtholders.  
The situation is similar when it comes to compensating managers, meaning that 
the payoff is asymmetric if the profits are overstated. The risk could be that the manager 
bias the accounts upwards if they have some room to do so. This risk is quite substantial 
since the manager frequently has more information than the other parties to the firm. For 
example, the manager likely has better information about the effects of new product 
development on the future cash flows than the shareholders, auditor or board of directors 
have. Absent the verification requirement the manager can bias estimates of those future 
cash flow effects upwards, not only producing large payments under earnings-based 
compensation plans, but also perhaps leading to negative net present value investments 
by the firm. It would be difficult to recover excess payments and prove fraud since 
estimates cannot easily be estimated. Even if fraud could be proven it would be difficult 
to litigate the person responsible on the excess payments and the loss on negatives 
present value investments.    
 Critics of conservatism argue that it leads to future income statements that are not 
“conservative”. For example land that is valued according to conservative principles will 
at some time (maybe) result in gains and for the period that it occurs the accounts will not 
be conservative. The critics somehow miss the point because the goal of conservative 
accounting is not to produce conservative earnings but a conservative value of net assets. 
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Besides, the alternative to conservative accounting could result in earnings that are even 
more subjective.  
2.1 Accounting Conservatism and the “Corporate Scandals”6  
Two terms that are related are “accounting” and so called “corporate scandals”. Even 
though we believe that some misuse of the accounting or fraud is an important 
component to cause a corporate scandal we also believe that a use of a conservative 
accounting will decrease the risk for a corporate scandal. Two of the most famous 
corporate scandals, Enron and WorldCom, also illustrate the importance of conservative 
accounting. For example the event that led to WorldCom’s bankruptcy was the 
announcement of that $3.9 billion of WorldCom’s costs of leasing other company’s 
networks having been “improperly” capitalized rather than expensed. The argument for 
the capitalization was that there was unused capacity that would result in future 
(unverifiable) business. Verification is a cornerstone in conservative accounting.       
In the case of Enron the bonus for the managers depended on the market value of 
energy-related contracts and derivatives. For a given contract, Enron managers could 
choose to select either a “bid” price (the price a market-maker is prepared to pay for the 
contract) or an “ask” price (the price at which a market-maker is prepared to sell the 
contract). It was up to the corporate managers to decide if the bid or ask price would be 
used. The Enron managers posted the ask prices that were sometimes as much as eight 
times the posted bid prices. While such ‘ask’ prices are unlikely to generate a sale at the 
end of a period, hence they enable significant over-valuation of contracts. Enron let the 
compensation depend on market values and as the example shows it easily results in 
overvaluation.    
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
                                                 
6
 The examples could be found in Watts 2003b. 
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3. Relevance of Accounting Conservatism in Corporate Governance 
to the modern corporate world  
 
The concept of conservatism in accounting practices relating to corporate governance has 
remained a predominant characteristic of the accounting field for several centuries. There 
is extensive research7 according to which one can infer that contracting and litigation 
consistently contribute to the existence of conservatism, apart from there being sufficient 
proof that tax and regulatory explanations contribute to accounting conservatism. 
According to another paper by Watts in the year 2003 different parties to the firm are 
subject to asymmetric information, asymmetric payoffs, limited liability and varying time 
horizons8. 
An important benefit of accounting conservatism is that it helps reduce moral hazard 
problems created by asymmetric payoffs and information by producing accounting 
numbers that can be used in contracts among different parties.  Other benefits of 
conservative accounting are as follows: 
• Conservatism in accounting reduces the probability of excess payments to 
managers at the expense of shareholders, or if the case may be excess 
distributions to shareholders at the expense of debtholders.  
• Conservatism in accounting also leads to deferment of earnings and generation of 
lower cumulative earnings and lower net assets which are more likely to result in 
reduce expected litigation costs for the firm than overstatement of net assets. 
• Conservatism in accounting results in better monitoring of management 
• Conservatism in accounting reduces the likelihood of litigation costs 
• Conservatism in accounting leads to the production of more timely accounting 
information and acknowledgement of bad news for the scrutiny of directors along 
with sufficient reasons for investigating the reasons for investigating the bad 
news. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Watts, 2003a. 
8
 Watts, 2003b. 
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4. Case Study-Ericsson and conservatism in strong governance firms 
vs. weak governance firms 
 
In order to measure the level of accounting conservatism in corporate governance we 
have included in our assignment a case study on Ericsson, Swedish Telecommunications 
Company. 
 
• 
9Ericsson is the largest supplier of mobile systems in the world and supports all 
major standards for wireless communication.  
• Ericsson provides total solutions - from systems and applications to services and 
core technology for mobile handsets.  
• Ericsson has been active worldwide since 1876 and is today present in more than 
140 countries with headquarters located in Stockholm, Sweden.   
 
We adopt Basu’s (1997) measure of conservatism measured according to the following 
econometrics function: 
 
Xt= β0 +  β1Dt + β2Rt + β3 Dt Rt + µt 
 
where Xt is earnings per share before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
deflated by share price at the beginning of the period. Rt is the stock rate of return of the 
firm, measured compounding twelve monthly 10CRSP ending the last day of fiscal year 
t.4 Dt is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the case of bad news (negative or zero stock 
rate of return) and 0 in the case of good news (positive stock rate of return). The 
coefficient β3 measures the level of asymmetric timeliness—the level of conservatism—
and it is expected to be positive and significant. 
 
 
The results of the regression have been summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 www.ericsson.com 
10
 The Centre for Research in Security Prices-http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/research/crsp/ stock returns 
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Constant β0 
tstat 
0.11 
0.20 
D β1 
tstat 
0.00 
0.23 
Return β2 
tstat 
0.12 
0.34 
D*Return β3 
tstat 
0.04 
2.75 
Adj R2  0.20 
 
 
The value of β3 indicates that there is a positive significant level of conservatism in 
accounting practices followed by Ericsson. 
 
Incorporating the level of governance within the firm we apply the following: a 
composite governance variable (Totgov) that incorporates the level of antitakeover 
protection (external governance) and several characteristics of the board’s structure 
(internal governance), based on a similar measure by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). 
Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), we define the composite governance 
variable (Totgov) by taking the unweighted average of the standardized variables based 
on unit weights following the recommendations of Grice and Harris (1998), The 
standardization is performed to take into account the different scales of the variables that 
make up the composite measure. Higher values of Totgov are expected to be associated 
with governance structures with higher antitakeover protection and high CEO influence 
in board decisions. 
Xt= β0 +  β1Dt + β2Rt + β3 Dt Rt + β4 Dt Rt Totgovt + µt 
 
The results of the regression have been summarized in Table 2. 
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  Dep variable 
X 
  
  MTB tercile   
  Low Medium High 
Constant β0 
tstat 
0.11 
0.20 
0.05 
0.16 
0.08 
0.34 
D β1 
tstat 
0.00 
0.23 
0.03 
-0.34 
0.00 
-0.16 
Return β2 
tstat 
0.12 
0.34 
0.06 
3.00 
0.07 
2.67 
D*Return β3 
tstat 
0.04 
2.75 
0.09 
2.50 
0.13 
4.56 
D*Return*Totgov β4 
tstat 
0.02 
3.46 
0.03 
1.24 
0.02 
3.56 
Adj R2  0.20 0.13 0.12 
 
When the dependent variable is earnings (X), the asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
coefficient β3 provides an estimate of the level of conservatism. We observe that strong 
governance firms are more conservative than weak governance firms (0.13 versus 0.04). 
 
5. Conclusions 
Theory indicates that accounting conservatism is important to establish an efficient 
corporate governance system. The case study of Ericsson supports the theoretical 
evidence, albeit the sample is small. An important aspect is that new accounting 
standards have recently been introduced and we do not know what effect they will have. 
According to the European standard-setters IASB, the unquestionable purpose of 
accounting is to give fair presentation of information in order to help users to make 
economic decisions under several well-established accounting conventions such as going 
concern, matching, and prudence.  
   13 
Matching 
Clearly making major assumptions about the future, the matching convention builds on 
the going concern convention that allow us to forward assets into future periods on that 
they will be used profitably later. In order to devise these recognition rules and heuristics 
the IASB requires that similar items, some of which are positive and others negative, 
must not be treated symmetrically. 
 
Prudence 
In the case of the IASB, prudence is not supposed to be overruling. Instead it is a degree 
of completeness where omissions would cause the financial statements to be misleading. 
If an investor tries to be conservative, the investor will almost certainly understate assets 
and pricing, such as valuing land or real estate based on original costs rather than present 
values. 
 
Given what IASB states about prudence (conservative accounting) it seems as there will 
still be some room for conservative accounting with the new rules, but we also believe 
that it depends on the accounting rule in question. Since the governments have the 
legislative power state participation used to be an important aspect of accounting rules, 
but the governments are becoming less important since independent organs decide upon 
the accounting rules. Despite this fact, being an active investor in the Swedish economy 
still means the government is in position to demand information. In Sweden, banks’ 
equity was transferred to funds organized as closed-end investment funds due to beliefs 
that are clearly reflected in tax policies that favour debt and, in particular, discriminate 
equity. Two of these funds, Investor and Industrivärden, have become the strategic 
investments of the two most powerful Swedish ownership structures, the Wallenberg and 
Handelsbanken, who control Sweden's largest listed companies. 
 
One benefit of acceleration of recognition of bad news is reduction in the likelihood of 
unforeseen costs. Matching and prudence can provide the board of directors with early-
warning signals to investigate the reasons for the bad news. Conservatism can also yield 
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unrecorded goodwill when understatements are made.11 During transition periods 
conservatism should occur until results are explained, so the strong governance can result 
in better monitoring of committees and produce more accurate information. More 
conservative borrowers also benefit lenders.12 Conservatism results in all these beneficial 
outcomes.  
We conclude that there are several reasons to use accounting conservatism in 
corporate governance and that current empirical evidence indicates that conservatism has 
increased in the last decades, but we do not know if this trend will continue in Europe 
with the new accounting rules. 
The value of β3 in Table 1 indicates that there is a positive significant level of 
conservatism in accounting practices followed by Ericsson. When the dependent variable 
is earnings (X), the asymmetric timeliness of earnings coefficient β3 in Table 2 provides 
an estimate of the level of conservatism. We observe that strong governance firms are 
more conservative than weak governance firms (0.13 versus 0.04). 
We expect and hypothesize that strong governance structures will tend to favour 
accounting conservatism more than weak governance structures. However, excessive 
dependencies on old structures show poor growth that has been since the oil crisis in the 
Western world.  
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